
Diversity and Disagreement in Science Communication

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It is uncontroversial for most that diversity and disagreement in science have epistemic and ethical benefits. But is it appropriate for researchers to communicate their disagreement and minority views to external audiences? For many philosophers, the answer is no: scientists and science journalist should communicate consensus positions and laypeople should defer to collective assessments rather than to individual scientists. Especially in the context of politicised fields such as in climate research (the field that I will be interested in here), this strategy can arguably increase both trust in and the trustworthiness of science. Nevertheless, I will argue that external science communication of dissenting, non-consensus views can have epistemic and ethical benefits as well. I discuss what implication this has for norms of science communication and ways in which we may do justice to both the need for consensus and the importance of legitimate disagreement.